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FOREWORD
By NORMAN DORSEN*

The articles published in this issue of the Kentucky Law
Journal are a fitting tribute to Paul Oberst. They do not
merely probe current constitutional problems but represent a
range of subjects and a diversity of viewpoints reflecting the
catholicity of Oberst's interests and his nicely balanced judgment. At another level, the four articles implicate two of
Paul's lifetime concerns: the securing of individual liberty and
the assurance of a judiciary that vigorously assumes, but does
not transcend, its rightful place in the American constitutional order.
The four articles, on first inspection, discuss widely different topics. Professor Sedler writes of school desegregation;
Professor Garvey of the civil commitment of children; Professor Nathanson of a transatlantic controversy that turns on the
alleged contempt of a daily newspaper; and Professor Barrett
of the appropriate equal protection standard of review of economic and social legislation.
In spite of their divergent subjects, a plausible grouping
of the articles is possible. The articles that seem to pit persons
against the state-Sedler's children seeking vindication of
rights to desegregated education and Barrett's litigants seeking relief from government regulation-can be separated from
those pieces that apparently involve a conflict between two individual rights-Garvey's discussion of the interests of parental autonomy versus the liberty of children, and Nathanson's
concern for a fair trial for criminal defendants versus a newspaper's freedom to publish.
But however plausible, this compartmentalization would
be misleading, not only in terms of the realities of the controversies discussed in the articles but also in view of the judicial
role in these disputes. Thus, in the school desegregation cases,
the principal opposition to integration typically comes from
* A.B. Columbia; L.L.B. Harvard. Professor of Law and Director of the Arthur
Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program, New York University School of Law. Professor
Dorsen is also President of the American Civil Liberties Union.
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parents of white children who assert-using school boards as
their conduit-the values of the neighborhood school and the
freedom of their children to associate with children of the
same race.1 Similarly, though less obviously, those challenging
on equal protection grounds various types of social legislation
are faced with opposition from their economic competitors,
and it is this private conflict that involves the real controversy.2
By the same token, very close to the surface of the two
articles centering on conflicting personal rights are important
and perhaps decisive governmental interests. The dispute
between the Distillers and The Sunday Times in the
thalidomide litigation was ultimately resolved (in different
ways) by the House of Lords and the European Court of
Human Rights on the basis of the capacity of British courts to
resist "trial by newspaper." The disputes between parents and
children in the civil commitment cases were seen by the Supreme Court more as a test of autonomy of the state institutions that admit and confine mentally ill and retarded children than as a conflict of individual rights.
If the four kinds of controversies that comprise this symposium should be viewed, like Janus, as peering in two directions at once-toward individual liberty and governmental interest-it is also true that the articles approach their subjects
in varying ways. The equal protection note is cautious, fearful
of undue judicial intervention in those social and economic affairs that seem better fitted to resolution by governmental officials. Despite powerful arguments that have been mounted
to justify a degree of judicial intervention against apparent arbitrariness in the name of equality of treatment, 3 the author
I

See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principalsof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.

REV. 1 (1959), a notorious article that was both misunderstood and misguided. See
generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 54-55 (1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1021-22 (1978).

1 See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), ouerruled, New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (American Express Company v. smaller firms selling
money orders); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (eye doctors v.

opticians).
I E.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 1 at 450-455; Note, Equal Protection:A Closer Look
at CloserScrutiny, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 771 (1978). See generally N. DORSEN, P. BENDER
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doubts the capacity of courts to pierce in a reasoned and disinterested way often inscrutable legislative products.
On the other hand, the Sedler article advances a bold reformulation of the "right" at issue in the school cases. His
approach, developed at length, would permit judges to cut
through increasingly arid controversies that turn on distinctions between rights and remedies, contrasts of de jure and de
facto segregation, and differentiations between northern and
southern schools when the stark conclusion of Brown v. Board
of Education4 that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" 5 still remains an unfulfilled constitutional
commitment.6
Similarly, Professor Garvey is undeterred by institutional
concerns in his aggressive plea for adequate recognition of the
right of children to better protection from harsh consequences
of parental
and medical decisions, however well-intended or
7
"expert."

Still another approach is exemplified by Professor Nathanson's balanced examination of the contempt power as a
punishment for publishing press reports during pending litigation. At home with British and continental European modes
of analysis, Nathanson views the long and complex
thalidomide case against the backdrop of the very different
way that American courts dispose of contempt citations
against the press.8
Whatever their other similarities and differences, all of
B. NEUBORNE & S. LAw, 2 EMERSON, HABER AND DORSEN'S PoLrricAL AND CIWL

RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1979).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Id. at 495.
' Other important works on this topic by Professor Sedler include Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregationin the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning
Small Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535; Sedler, Book
Review, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 645 (1977).
7 Family relationships, especially those involving children, are increasingly in the

forefront of constitutional law developments. See, e.g., M.

GUGGENHEIM

& A. Suss-

MAN, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS (1980); A. SUSSMAN, THE RIGHTS OF YOUNG PEOPLE

(1977).
1 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962). Contra, Nebraska Press Ass'n. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). For another valuable analysis of The Sunday Times case,
see Griffith, The Political Constitution,42 MOD. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1979).
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these articles reduce to the question that has haunted American constitutional law from the start: What is the proper role
of the courts in protecting individual rights in a federal democratic system? Paul Oberst has made a valued contribution to
analysis of these issues from both national" and state 0 perspectives. This symposium is therefore a fitting testimonial to
his work as a law teacher and scholar. It is also a proper tribute to the other aspects of a life dedicated to service and humanity.1" It is a great privilege and pleasure for me to introduce this fine symposium to honor Paul Oberst.

See Oberst, The Strange Careerof Plessy v. Fergusson, 15 Aiz. L. REv. 389
(1973); Oberst, Book Review, 12 Sw. L.J. 256 (1958).
"0See Oberst, ConstitutionalReform in Kentucky-The 1966 Proposal,55 Ky.
L.J. 50 (1968). See also Oberst, The Genesis of the Three States'-Rights Amendments of 1963, 39 NoTRE DAbim LAW. 644 (1964); Oberst, The Supreme Court and
State Rights, 48 Ky. L.J. 63 (1959).
1 One of Paul's many contributions was to the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University Law School, which he directed from 1959-1961.
I had the honor to succeed him in this position and therefore can testify from observation to his industry, his firm dedication to the ideals of individual liberty, and to
the way in which his private acts of love paralleled his professional efforts.

